Strategic blunder led Georgia into S.Ossetia folly

A Georgian soldier helps to direct a tank in Gori, some 80 km (50 miles) from Tbilisi, August 11, 2008. The simmering conflict between Russia and its small, former Soviet neighbour erupted last Thursday when Georgia sent forces into South Ossetia, a pro-Russian province that threw off Georgian rule in the 1990s.

LONDON (Reuters) - Georgia made a strategic miscalculation in trying to rapidly overrun South Ossetia, and as a result has probably lost the region for good, regional analysts say.

While Russian-backed separatists in the breakaway Georgian region helped provoke Georgia into action, it was the belief that its troops could secure a lightning victory that underpinned Georgia's decision to attack.

"The Georgians rolled the dice and they lost," said Michael Denison, an expert in Russian and Eurasian affairs at Chatham House, a London-based security think tank.

"It was not an unreasonable calculation to go for a rapid win, but in the end it was a miscalculation."

Georgia, which has several restless regions within its territory, has managed to quell low-level insurgencies on its turf in recent years -- notably in the Kodori Gorge and the Adjara region -- without provoking Russian reaction.

It calculated that, with the recent change of leadership in Moscow and by timing the attack to coincide with the opening of the Olympics, it could secure a quick and relatively trouble-free victory.

"The capital Tskhinvali is relatively small, no more than around 25,000 people, and they probably thought they could just take it and be done," said Denison.

"They may have calculated that some people would leave the region and flee north to North Ossetia, but the rest would stay and the problem would basically be resolved."

In hindsight, he said, the Georgians should have thought about blocking or blowing up the Roki Tunnel that links South Ossetia to Russia and gave Russian forces access to the region. But the Georgians needed to keep the tunnel open so that South Ossetians could escape north.

Denison and others note that South Ossetia's separatists had been provoking Georgia for some time, probably counting on Russia to come to their aid if needed.

"The Russians have been provoking for a long time and I don't doubt that they stoked up the separatists to start attacking," said Bruce George, a British member of parliament with a long-term association with Georgia.

"At the same time if you embark on a war, as the Georgians did, you have to work out what the consequences will be. It was inevitable that the Russians would react very heavily... and at this stage it seems uncertain that they will stop."

Denison, who was last in South Ossetia a few months ago, said Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's assertion that it was now very unlikely South Ossetia would ever be integrated into Georgia had all but sealed the region's fate.

"If the Russians hadn't intervened and Georgia had taken over, some South Ossetians would have fled, but most probably would have been okay, and South Ossetia probably would have been better off economically and culturally.

"As it is, now they are looking at being a small outpost on the southern reaches of Russia."

(Reporting by Luke Baker; editing by Kate Kelland, Tim Pearce)