Q+A: Will crackdown on Taliban help reintegration?

KABUL (Reuters) - A major offensive in Afghanistan and the capture of the Taliban's No. 2 has put psychological pressure on the group at a time when the Kabul government is reaching out to foot soldiers to join a reintegration program.

The reintegration plan, which will be funded by the West and led by the Afghan government, forms part of efforts by Washington and its allies to build a foundation for the start of a gradual U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011.

Here are some questions and answers on reintegration and reconciliation and other efforts to stabilize Afghanistan:

WHICH INSURGENTS WILL BE TARGETED?

The United States and its allies have so far spoken only of reconciliation with those Taliban who renounce violence, sever ties with al Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution.

Foreign donors are funding an Afghan plan to reintegrate rank-and-file Taliban fighters using jobs and cash, an initiative the Taliban have described as a "trick".

Taliban insurgents have repeatedly turned down Afghan President Hamid Karzai's peace proposal, saying foreign troops should leave Afghanistan before any peace talks can take place.

And the insurgency is at its strongest since the Taliban's removal in 2001. But it faces a surge in foreign troops.

HAS THE OFFENSIVE IN MARJAH WEAKENED THE TALIBAN?

U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke said a number of fighters and groups were trying to "come in from the cold" as a NATO offensive in Marjah in Afghanistan's most violent province pushes on. He did not say how many.

But it is too early to gauge whether the campaign will put enough heat on the Taliban to force a significant number of fighters to consider reintegration. While U.S. Marines have taken several parts of Marjah, the Taliban have been digging in for a fight to the death.

Without a stronger military advantage, the West may struggle to achieve its goals. Attempts by Karzai and the West to lure Taliban foot soldiers away from the conflict may fail unless the fighters feel they can't win.

And success will depend on whether there is enough cash and how quickly projects kick off.

Taliban fighters who may have fled before the offensive could just wait it out, perhaps until U.S. troops start withdrawing, and then try to again rule Marjah, a lucrative poppy cultivation center which the West says funds the insurgency.

There is also the fear factor. Taliban militants who express an interest in reintegration projects risk death. People who have enquired about jobs have been threatened, Western officials say.

CAN CAPTURED TALIBAN NO 2 SPEARHEAD RECONCILIATION?

The capture of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar in a joint Pakistani-U.S. raid this month may have been an intelligence coup. And it could deal a psychological blow to his supporters and disrupt operations.

But Mullah Baradar's history suggests he would reject any attempts by the Afghan government or U.S. to use him to spearhead reconciliation.

He is the Taliban's top military commander and has focused much of his energy on rebuilding the group to become a powerful fighting machine that wages relentless holy war.

The arrest should bolster Pakistan's position as it tries to play a leading role in any Afghan peace process. But Mullah Baradar has not enjoyed close ties to the Pakistanis, a former Taliban official said, and may refuse to cooperate.

If he is co-opted, Baradar could lose credibility. And even if he is willing to risk that to cut a deal, the Taliban are not one single movement that thinks and acts in unison. Factions could reject his efforts and undermine any progress.

The arrest of two Taliban shadow governors and a U.S. missile strike which killed the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, head of a network which has carried out attacks in Afghanistan, may also make the Taliban uncomfortable.

But that may not be enough to force them to consider laying down their arms and negotiating, since they are in a position of strength.

(Editing by Bryson Hull)