Lehman balance sheet massaging may not be unusual

NEW YORK Fri Mar 12, 2010 9:34pm EST

People stand next to windows above an exterior sign at the Lehman Brothers headquarters in New York in this September 16, 2008 file photo. REUTERS/Chip East/Files

People stand next to windows above an exterior sign at the Lehman Brothers headquarters in New York in this September 16, 2008 file photo.

Credit: Reuters/Chip East/Files

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NEW YORK (Reuters) - On Wall Street, massaging the balance sheet is a time-honored practice.

But did Lehman Brothers Holding Inc LEHMQ.PK cross a line in the routine manipulation of its balance sheet, as described by an independent examiner?

That is the central question to emerge from the examiner's report, released late on Thursday by the bankruptcy court in Manhattan, which details examples of Lehman concealing assets and liabilities through accounting techniques.

Thomas Baxter, general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, one of the main banking regulators, told the examiner, Anton Valukas, that he was generally aware of firms using "balance-sheet window dressing," but had no specific information on Lehman.

Banks have wrestled with this issue for years. The old Bankers Trust, for instance, struggled to fend off bank clients that wanted to use BT to help conceal assets, said Ray Soifer, a consultant who previously worked at BT and sat on a task force designed to reduce that business.

"Reducing leverage is something that banks do. It's cosmetic," Soifer said.

In 2003, an internal review into accounting irregularities at Freddie Mac FRE.N found the government-sponsored mortgage finance firm had periodically rented out its balance sheet to a Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN.VX) mortgage trader.

The review found that Freddie Mac entered into a series of deals with Credit Suisse that allowed the investment bank's trading desk to "park" some $8 billion in mortgage-backed securities on the mortgage firm's balance sheet.

Over the years, one common trick has been to borrow money at the beginning of the quarter and invest it in short-term bonds that mature before the end of the quarter. When the bonds mature, the bank pays back its debt and it has fewer assets and liabilities.

The upshot is that the bank generates more profit off what appears to be fewer assets, giving it a better return on assets, a commonly watched measure of profitability.

One former chief executive at a bank noted this method can goose earnings higher, but is terrible for the company long term because it does not build the overall franchise.

For commercial banks, regulators caught onto this trick years ago, which is why banks typically report average assets during the quarter in addition to assets at the end of the quarter, both to the public and to regulators.

But major investment banks did not have that obligation and, even now, often do not report their average assets to investors.

"Nobody knows if other banks are doing this kind of thing," said Brad Hintz, an analyst at Sanford Bernstein who was Lehman's Chief Financial Officer in the 1990s. But he said the question is sure to come up in conference calls for Morgan Stanley (MS.N) and Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS.N).


The mechanism that Lehman used for concealing assets and liabilities was much more complicated than borrowing at the beginning of the quarter and paying down debt at the end.

It involved a series of short-term transactions similar to repurchase or repo deals, which entail selling assets and agreeing to buy them back in the future, according to the examiner's


Lehman's deals were known as Repo 105 transactions. But instead of treating them as financings, Lehman classified these repo deals as "sales," which permitted the investment bank to keep the transactions off balance sheet.

Here is how it worked: Lehman essentially transferred assets to its London unit, which was the only jurisdiction where the bank could get lawyers at Linklaters to sign off on the deals. At the end of a quarter, Lehman would sell high quality assets to a counterparty -- the examiner's report mentions multiple European and Japanese banks -- for cash. The investment bank typically got cash equal to about 5 percent less than the face value of the asset. Lehman used the cash to pay down debt.

At the start of the next quarter, Lehman would buy back the assets and borrow funds again.

The net impact was the bank had lower assets and liabilities, making it appear to have less debt relative to its equity than it really did.

These transactions may have started out small in 2001, but by 2008 Lehman was using them to move big chunks of assets.

The bank did about $50 billion of these transactions in the second quarter of 2008, which reduced its reported assets by about 7 percent, based on the company's financial statements for that quarter. That reduced its leverage ratios by nearly 2 points.

The massaging allowed Lehman's leverage numbers to look much better than competitors. According to data compiled by Bernstein's Hintz, Lehman's net leverage ratio was 14.7 in the second quarter of 2008, compared with 20.8 for Goldman Sachs. Net leverage excludes repo assets and looks at assets compared with equity.


Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant for the Securities and Exchange Commission and now senior advisor to the consulting firm LECG, said the decision by Lehman executives to make greater use of Repo 105 is consistent with what companies do when they get themselves into trouble.

"Companies never just fudge it a little bit," said Turner. "They start out just doing it a little bit and over time it grows and grows."

While Turner said he was not aware of the Repo 105 transactions during this time at the SEC, he said it is fair "to wonder if anyone else is doing it."

Turner added: "No one is going to stand up and say so."

(Reporting by Dan Wilchins and Matthew Goldstein; editing by Andre Grenon)

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Comments (4)
breezinthru wrote:
The USA is not a third world country. We are supposed to have accounting standards that investors can “bank” on.

If this is a widespread practice, then we should start now to build enough dark, dank, rat-infested prisons to hold all the bastards that are going to need long term confinement.

Mar 12, 2010 7:45pm EST  --  Report as abuse
Am 99 44/100% sure other banksters have been doing this. The real question is, what is the SEC and/or Federal reserve going to do about it? Odds are, not a darn thing. They NEED this accounting fraud to make it look like banksters/investment companies are still solvent/viable.

Got physical gold? You’ll want it when the dollar comes crashing down due to devaluation. You see, the REAL game is not this basically known fraud, what many do not realize is that the reason the SEC and Fed allows this fraud is they MUST keep the game going of the CONfidence many have of the USD. The USD< like the Euro, is really just pure faith, like Monopoly money. Once that faith is lost, the intrinsic value is like Zim dollars, where even a trillion does not buy a loaf of bread. So again the REAL question is, how long can the SEC, Fed, etc keep this scam running.

The USA is right now on their THIRD central banking system, the previous two failed. Not a single FIAT paper currency has ever survived in the history of man. So they MUST keep the faith in investment houses going, the faith that various entities are solvent (to avoid the domino collapse), and the faith that the USA’s MASSIVE underlining paper scheme (stocks, bonds, mortgages, CDS, etc) are not just based on thin air and actually have value.

Again, got physical gold because it is the safe haven that even central banks reply on. This is why they are right now BUYING and not sellers of gold.

Mar 12, 2010 9:06pm EST  --  Report as abuse
yr2009 wrote:
You unfairly give massage a bad reputation.

Breech of trust and improper disclosure with the intent of misleading investors demands a serious approach from the media, as I’m sure it will get from Cuomo.

Mar 13, 2010 8:21am EST  --  Report as abuse
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