UPDATE 2-Lehman examiner full report adds pieces to puzzle

* Judge overrules objection of CME Group

* Long-awaited deposition left out

By Emily Chasan and Dan Margolies

NEW YORK/WASHINGTON, April 14 (Reuters) - From accounting gimmicks to flummoxed risk managers, newly released documents gathered by the court-appointed examiner of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc LEHMQ.PK shed fresh light on some of the factors that propelled the bank to bankruptcy.

But some of the most widely sought pieces of the investigation were still missing: the depositions of former Chief Executive Richard Fuld and other key figures at the bank.

Examiner Anton Valukas, chairman of law firm Jenner & Block, told Reuters that none of the interviews and depositions will be released, ever.

"There are a multitude of reasons" they will remain sealed, he said, without elaborating. He declined to comment on whether the decision to keep them under seal might relate to ongoing investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or the Department of Justice.

Earlier on Wednesday, Barclays Bank (BARC.L), Goldman Sachs (GS.N), Morgan Stanley (MS.N), JPMorgan Chase (JPM.N), and Chicago-based trading firms Citadel LP and DRW Trading were identified as the firms asked to participate in an emergency auction of Lehman's futures positions as firm lurched toward bankruptcy in September 2008.

That disclosure was the final part of the examiner's report to be made public as exchange operator CME Group (CME.O) lost a bid in bankruptcy court to keep the identities of the companies secret. [nN14162938]

The report concluded "that an argument can be made that the transfers at issue were fraudulent transfers," noting that Lehman lost $1.2 billion in the sale of a $2 billion portfolio to Barclays, Goldman and DRW.

CME Group, with the support of the futures industry, had sought to withhold the names of buyers of Lehman's former futures and options positions in a special auction conducted by CME in the midst of Lehman's 2008 collapse.

SHORT-SELLERS BLAMED

The documents released included many of those cited in 8,000 different footnotes in the examiner's report. The report revealed last month that accounting gimmicks may have led to the investment bank's collapse.

But the exhibits that were released -- many of them in the form of emails between executives at the firm -- painted a vivid picture of a firm in disarray that often scapegoated outside nemeses -- including short-sellers like Greenlight Capital hedge fund manager David Einhorn -- rather than tackling the firm's problems head on. [nN14142261]

The documents also reinforce the sense that the firm was struggling with accounting issues as early as February 2007.

"We have issues in mortgages and liquid markets," warned Joseph Gentile, who at the time was chief financial officer at Lehman's Global Investment Bank, in an email to Gerard Reilly, best known as the firm's pointman on Repo 105, an accounting gimmick that helped the firm make it appear to be reducing leverage levels.

"I have been able to get a temp limit of 3 bn for repo 105 activity, which covers known real estate issues," Gentile wrote.

Another email, written a month earlier, warns that daily stress test scenarios generated by the firm's risk management department were virtually ignored.

STRESS TESTING

"Simply put, not one of the business heads depended on the (risk management) report," wrote James Ballentine, a managing director at Lehman. "Most didn't even know that it was produced daily, and not one looked at it with any frequency."

Lehman was required by the SEC to conduct regular stress tests on its portfolio to determine catastrophic losses. In 2005, the agency concluded that Lehman's management of risk was "robust given their current risk profile."

Lehman adopted stress testing that year but applied it only to stocks, bonds and other tradable securities. It did not include assets like commercial real estate, which made up a small portion of its portfolio at the time.

After Korea Development Bank expressed interest in early 2008 in making a private investment in Lehman, another email shows the bravado of top executives in resisting a chance to raise capital that they might have later embraced.

"Absolutely, (Lehman) Bros not for sale on the cheap!!!," Lehman chief strategy officer David Goldfarb wrote to Fuld and other key executives.

Following a more than year-long investigation, Lehman examiner Valukas released an initial version of the report on March 11, which revealed accounting gimmicks may have led to the investment bank's collapse. [ID:nN11252693]]

The case is In re: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, No. 08-13555. (Reporting by Emily Chasan; Editing by Maureen Bavdek and Steve Orlofsky)