U.S. Afghan aims "incredibly hard": U.N. official

LONDON (Reuters) - U.S. goals in Afghanistan will be "incredibly hard" to achieve because of tough Taliban armed resistance and weaknesses in political reconciliation efforts, a U.N. official who monitors al Qaeda and the Taliban said.

In a Reuters interview, Richard Barrett added that Britain's justification for deploying troops in Afghanistan on grounds of national security was "debatable," as it was not clear that a post-war Taliban movement would bring back al Qaeda.

His comments add to a tide of skepticism about the coalition campaign following tougher-than-expected Taliban resistance in the southerly Marjah district, and a slower start to a long-awaited offensive in the Taliban's birthplace of Kandahar.

Barrett, coordinator of the U.N. Taliban-Al Qaeda Sanctions Monitoring Committee, predicted a stern Taliban response and suggested a way had to be found to engage the group politically.

"However many of them you kill, there'll be more coming over the hill," said Barrett, a former British intelligence official.

"You're not dealing with people who you punch hard and they run away. They're not going to run away."

The U.S. strategy hinges on pouring forces into southern Afghanistan before starting a gradual withdrawal in July 2011, conditions permitting.

Barrett said the Kandahar push had to be backed by a strong

Barrett said the Kandahar push had to be backed by a strong political campaign, but the resources available to U.S. commanders were "essentially military, not political":

"The Afghans are in charge of the political side and there's still a great weakness there."

TRIBAL GATHERING

A June 4 meeting of Afghan tribal elders and religious leaders handed President Hamid Karzai a mandate to open negotiations with the insurgents. But the Taliban dismissed the jirga as a phoney American-inspired show.

"I don't believe that the strategy is wrong or the objectives are wrong. It's just that the objectives are incredibly hard to achieve," Barrett said.

There were several reasons for that, he said.

If the coalition claimed it had evicted the Taliban from Kandahar, it only needed one suicide bombing to demonstrate that it remained.

Also, it would be difficult to determine who was or was not Taliban, and who "won't be Taliban tomorrow."

On Britain's role, Barrett said its counter-terrorism strategy overall was "very good" and the West's post-2001 goal of chasing al Qaeda from Afghanistan and ensuring it was unable to mount Sept 11-style attacks had been achieved.

"So why are we still in Afghanistan? The (official) answer is that if we left, the Taliban would come back and al Qaeda would come with them. That's the bit I think is contentious."

British Prime Minster David Cameron said on a visit to Afghanistan last week that if the British left "tomorrow," al Qaeda training camps would come back to Afghanistan, because the Afghans were not yet ready to look after their own security.

The Taliban say they would not allow anyone in Afghanistan to threaten other countries in a post-war scenario, and Barrett said it was a "reasonable criticism" to question the sincerity of this and the Taliban's ability to enforce such a position.

"But nonetheless, where do you start from?

"If you start from the point that 'This is what you said and we'll deal with you on that basis. Now let's go forward, and if you don't go forward on this, clearly we'll have to think again', that seems to me to be a much more sensible way forward than saying 'No, we don't believe you and we're going to stay here forever' - because we are not going to stay there forever."

(Editing by Kevin Liffey)