FACTBOX: How SocGen trades were hidden - ministry

(Reuters) - France's economy ministry on Monday issued a report on the Societe Generale (SOGN.PA) trading scandal.

The bank says it lost 4.9 billion euros when it unwound 50 billion euros of unauthorized futures positions built up by one junior trader. The ministry report sheds new light on the type of trades involved, but says its job is not to apportion blame.

This is how the ministry says the exposure was hidden, based on information supplied to its officials by SocGen.

"The real unauthorized position appears to have been concealed mainly by using the following fictional operations:

* Purchase or sale of shares or warrants with a deferred date, a type of operation which is usually only confirmed several days before the value date.

* Futures transactions where the counterparty is described as "pending" or awaiting designation, something which does not filter down to the systems used in the back office.

* Forwards with an internal counterparty in the group, which does not require a margin payment.

* Forwards with an external counterparty, the technique used to close 2007, accompanied by a falsified pre-confirmation in order to avoid questions about intra-group accounting gaps."

The report goes on to draw the attention of the Bank of France's Banking Commission, which is conducting the official investigation into the trading losses, to a number of areas that "may have been decisive" in failing to avert the scandal.

* "Monitoring of nominal outstanding positions held by traders (as opposed to the net positions, which by definition only show up as a limited market risk).

* Monitoring treasury flows (margin calls and payments, guarantees and results)

* The detailed response to requests for information addressed to the bank by the Eurex exchange in November 2007

* The way in which cancellations and modifications of transactions coming from one single trader were followed up.

* Confirmation of operations with all counterparties

* Respect of Chinese Wall between front and back office and the transversal organization of the middle and back offices.

* Security of computer systems and protection of access codes

* Monitoring of unusual behavior including holidays not taken".

(Reporting by Tim Hepher; editing by Anshuman Daga)