FACTBOX-What pitfalls lurk in Iran nuclear agreements?
(expands on low-enriched uranium pitfall)
By Mark Heinrich
Oct 2 (Reuters) - Here is a rundown of what was - and wasn't - agreed at Geneva talks between Iran and six world powers on Oct. 1, and an examination of possible pitfalls.
WHAT THE TALKS FAILED TO ADDRESS
Iran gave no ground on the core issues of nuclear restraint and transparency in its protracted standoff with world powers, concerns they will pursue in another round of talks this month.
Tehran insisted on its right to a sovereign nuclear energy programme despite U.N. resolutions ordering it to suspend enrichment in exchange for trade benefits. It has even rejected a temporary freeze on expansion of enrichment capacity.
No progress was reported on IAEA demands that Iran allow unfettered access for its UN inspectors to check intelligence reports suggesting Tehran has researched ways to arm missiles with nuclear payloads. The IAEA also wants Iran to permit snap inspections beyond declared nuclear sites to defuse mistrust.
IAEA ACCESS TO NEWLY REVEALED NUCLEAR SITE
Iran promised to grant access for U.N. nuclear watchdog inspectors to a second uranium enrichment plant in the making after revealing its existence last week, 3 1/2 years after Western intelligence services said construction began.
PITFALLS
Iran did not commit to a timetable at the talks for baring the hidden second enrichment site to the IAEA, saying only that inspectors were "not far away" from being able to visit it.
It has yet to address IAEA demands not just for one-off access but round-the-clock surveillance, design documentation and contact with Iranian nuclear officials to question them about the plant's origins and purpose.
The IAEA wants to verify the Qom-area plant was and will be designed only to enrich uranium only to low levels suitable for power plant fuel. The longer it takes to get inspectors into the site, the more Western powers will suspect Iran is using the hiatus to remove any indications of military nuclear intent.
IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei will go to Tehran this weekend to try to pin down a time frame for IAEA access. The IAEA has 24-hour monitoring of a larger enrichment complex at Natanz, which was also secret until Iranian opposition exiles exposed it in 2002.
SENDING IRAN'S ENRICHED URANIUM ABROAD
Iran agreed in principle to send low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia and France for further processing and then its return for use by a Tehran reactor, which is under regular IAEA monitoring, to produce medical isotopes.
PITFALLS
Iran has not confirmed Western accounts that it was expected to ship 1.2 of its total 1.5 metric tonnes of low-enriched uranium to Russia and China. The deal was in principle only without a guarantee Iran would follow through.
The uranium deal will mean little if Iran has clandestine supplies of enriched uranium too. Without wide-ranging snap inspections, the IAEA can't verify the declared Natanz stockpile is all there is.
A SECOND MEETING BEFORE END OF OCTOBER
Merely agreeing to further talks was a relief for those who feared escalating confrontation following the revelation of the second enrichment site, underlining Iran's defiance of U.N. resolutions demanding it suspend enrichment entirely.
(Editing by Janet McBride)
