FACTBOX: Key aspects of latest IAEA findings on Iran
(Reuters) - An International Atomic Energy Agency report on February 22 said Iran had not responded adequately to intelligence alleging it studied technology applicable to making atom bombs, but had defused concerns about other activities.
IAEA board governors will debate the findings this week.
Following are highlights from the 11-page report and a power-point presentation to members of the IAEA's 35-nation governing board on February 25 that added detail not in the report.
MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUE
Since 2005 the IAEA has received extensive intelligence from the United States and some U.S. allies pointing to what they say are past Iranian attempts to "weaponize" nuclear materials.
The documentation, some of which was revealed in the report for the first time, suggests administrative connections between projects to process uranium ore for nuclear fuel, test high explosives and design a missile warhead.
It refers to plans for tests with explosives placed 400 meters (1,300 feet) underground and detonated from 10 km (6 miles) away, a procedure "relevant" to developing atom bombs. It cited drawings of the inner cone of a missile warhead "quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device".
The IAEA's safeguards chief on February 25 presented more documentation, slides and video not mentioned in the report.
He said it showed that explosives were to be detonated at 600 meters (2,000 feet) altitude, a specification suitable only for nuclear arms. An organizational chart was screened showing the key projects all reporting to Mohsen Fakrizadeh under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.
The documentation referred to a "progress report" on the projects for the period between July 9, 2003 and January 14, 2004.
A U.S. intelligence report in December said Iran stopped trying to devise an atomic warhead in 2003 but kept up efforts to master uranium enrichment technology of potential use for bombs.
Iran has rejected the documentation as "baseless", "fabricated" or touching on solely conventional arms plans.
IAEA officials say they have not been able to verify the intelligence as authentic, but regard it as serious enough to keeping pressing Iran to back up its denials with evidence.
ISSUES NO LONGER OUTSTANDING
-- Iran explained that particles of highly enriched -- potentially weapons-grade -- uranium found by inspectors on equipment in a technical university came from used centrifuge parts imported from Pakistan.
-- Iran clarified that past research with polonium-210, a radioactive element of possible use in neutron triggers for atom bombs, but also for civilian products like batteries, was a private, civilian initiative.
ADVANCES IN TRANSPARENCY
Iran partially lifted a veil on some aspects of its current nuclear development activities imposed in 2006 in retaliation for U.N. sanctions. It allowed senior IAEA officials to visit facilities developing advanced enrichment centrifuges.
But the new access was limited and one-off. The IAEA renewed a call on Iran to adopt the Additional Protocol, a binding regime of wide-ranging snap inspections needed to verify there is no bomb-oriented activity away from declared nuclear sites.
PROGRESS WITH ENRICHMENT TECHNOLOGY
Iran has begun testing advanced centrifuges in the pilot wing of its Natanz enrichment complex. They could enrich uranium 2-3 times faster than older, erratic centrifuges now enriching uranium at very low capacity.
(Writing by Mark Heinrich in Vienna; Editing by Janet Lawrence)
