Key issues in U.N. bid to curb Iran nuclear program
(Reuters) - World powers were to meet in Berlin on Tuesday to show resolve against Iran's atomic program, but suggested a deal on provisions for broader U.N. sanctions against Tehran would require more time.
International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei met Iranian leaders on January 11-12 to seek faster cooperation with efforts to clarify its disputed atomic energy program.
Following is an outline of issues remaining or resolved.
* OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS ABOUT PAST PROGRAMME:
-- The IAEA has U.S. intelligence indicating Iran has tried to weaponise nuclear materials by linking processing of uranium ore, tests on high explosives and design of a missile warhead.
-- After long rejecting the information as propaganda, Iran has begun substantive talks with IAEA experts on the matter, according to diplomats close to the agency.
-- A subsequent U.S. intelligence report last December said Iran apparently stopped an active, covert atom bomb program in 2003. But Western diplomats remain skeptical of Iran's readiness to address weaponisation fully for fear of self-incrimination.
-- Inspectors want credible explanations for traces of highly-enriched -- or bomb-grade -- uranium (HEU) found at physics research sites, as well as the role of their scientists, what equipment they procured and why. The IAEA accepted Iranian explanations about other HEU traces found earlier that they came with equipment obtained from a Pakistani-led smuggling network.
* ISSUES ABOUT PRESENT PROGRAMME
-- Iran has refused to suspend uranium enrichment, a process that could yield energy or bombs, despite resolutions by the U.N. Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors demanding it do so to defuse mistrust. Instead, it has rapidly expanded an underground centrifuge production plant.
-- The IAEA wants Iran to implement its Additional Protocol, which permits short-notice inspections at locations beyond declared nuclear sites. The measure, which would allow access to workshops where Iran is developing an advanced enrichment centrifuge, is needed for the IAEA to verify there is no parallel activity geared to yielding bombs, rather than the goal of Iran's declared program -- electricity. Without it, the IAEA cannot verify all nuclear work in the country is peaceful.
-- Last April, in retaliation for sanctions, Iran stopped giving the IAEA advance design data on planned nuclear sites. The IAEA has repeatedly urged Iran to reconsider the move.
* ISSUES ABOUT PAST ADDRESSED BY IRAN:
-- Iran broadly clarified when and how it launched its program by obtaining blueprints and parts for centrifuge enrichment machines in the 1980s and 1990s from nuclear black marketeers led by Pakistan's A.Q. Khan. However, the IAEA has yet to verify the "completeness" of Iran's declaration.
-- Iran turned over a copy of a Khan network manual roughly outlining how to mould uranium metal into spheres for nuclear warheads. Iran previously refused to let inspectors make copies for investigative purposes. It said it never used the manual.
-- Iran accounted for experiments with plutonium, a prime ingredient in atom bombs, enough for the IAEA to conclude they did not pose a concern about weaponisation.
(Reporting by Mark Heinrich; Editing by David Cutler)
