U.S. strike on Qaeda leader seen as limited success
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. success in killing a top al Qaeda operative this week showed that cooperation with Pakistan can be fruitful but security analysts said there were limits to what the present strategy can achieve.
Analysts said the unmanned Predator air strike that apparently killed Abu Laith al-Libi in a remote area of Pakistan demonstrated that the United States has the military reach and intelligence sources to carry out a precision attack on a specific target with Pakistani consent.
But U.S. participation in a ground offensive against al Qaeda strongholds along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is unlikely. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has publicly opposed it and the Pakistani military may not be able to mount effective operations deep in tribal frontier regions.
"The arrangement that appears to have been reached between the United States and Pakistan is that it's OK to cooperate on targeted strikes against al Qaeda leaders," said Seth Jones, a RAND Corp terrorism analyst who recently returned from the border region.
"But it's not OK at the moment for U.S. forces to try to clear and hold territory that is controlled by al Qaeda or al Qaeda related groups in Pakistan," he said.
Libi, whom Western officials described as a senior member of al Qaeda's global leadership and a top military commander in Afghanistan, appears to have been one of 13 foreign militants killed in Pakistan's North Waziristan border area.
An al Qaeda-linked Web site and Western authorities confirmed the death but did not discuss the circumstances. The Pentagon denied taking part in the attack. The CIA, which also flies Predator missions, declined to comment.
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The strike followed a push in recent weeks by U.S. officials to extend cooperation with Pakistan. CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell and Adm. William Fallon, the top U.S. military commander in the region, all visited Pakistan last month.
It was unclear whether the strike on Libi was a direct consequence. However, Jones said, "There has been a constant communication over the last couple of months ... it's a drumbeat that's coming from Washington," that the crackdown against al Qaeda must be stepped up.
A series of plots against Western targets that have been linked to al Qaeda in Pakistan raised the sense of urgency in the United States and its NATO allies, Jones said.
He said there had been "minimal activity" in targeting al Qaeda leaders in their strongholds, partly because U.S. officials were wary of provoking more anti-Americanism within the population.
U.S. involvement has been limited to training Pakistani security forces, supplying equipment such as night vision goggles, and collecting intelligence, analysts said.
Similar Predator strikes against al Qaeda leaders have met opposition in Pakistan when civilians were killed.
Henry Crumpton, who led the CIA's operations in Afghanistan when al Qaeda and the Taliban were routed after the September 11 attacks, said Pakistan has been cooperative.
But it lacks control over the region and has to reckon with the fact al Qaeda and the Taliban retain a firm hold over the border tribes, through intimidation and alliances. Pakistan's turbulent national politics has also made it more difficult for the government and military to take decisive action.
Crumpton told Reuters the strikes against al Qaeda leadership were one leg of a three-legged strategy necessary to neutralize the group's threat. The other two were removing its safe havens and addressing the region's economic and social needs to win tribal support.
"When you see progress in all three of those areas in the tribal lands, then I think you're going to see some real progress," he said in a speech earlier this month. "We cannot wait. We need to address this issue because it's getting worse, not better."
