Iraq-U.S. pact leaves PM Maliki stronger than ever

BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was written off a year ago as weak and sectarian, but a pact requiring U.S. troops to withdraw has enabled him to emerge as a nationalist strongman.

His critics now complain he is overbearing and authoritarian.

Initially derided by both Sunni Arab and Shi'ite opponents as a U.S. puppet, yet also accused of being manipulated by America's foe Shi'ite Iran, there were mutterings in Washington and Baghdad of replacing Maliki back in 2007.

Parliament's passing of a pact on Thursday requiring U.S. troops to leave Iraq in three years shows how much things have changed. Maliki used the U.S. military presence to strengthen his power base, then negotiated its withdrawal on his own terms.

"He is by far the Iraqi politician who has benefited most from the (U.S. presence) because he has been able to exploit it to strengthen his personal prestige," said Reidar Visser, an Iraq expert and editor of the www.historiae.org website.

"(The pact) crowns Maliki's efforts: a gradual drawdown that focuses on training Iraqi security forces that (is) slow enough to give him a maximum of possibility of staying in power."

Maliki negotiated hard with Washington to include a firm deadline for a withdrawal of the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, which the outgoing administration of George W. Bush agreed to after months of tough talks. U.S. troops must be out of the towns by mid 2009 and withdraw completely by the end of 2011.

GROWING POWER

With the help of the U.S. military, Maliki has cracked down on al Qaeda and other Sunni Arab insurgents in northern Iraq, but also on gunmen loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al Sadr -- leading Sunni Arabs to rally around him and enabling him to rebuff the charge of sectarianism.

"Maliki is a patriot," said powerful Sunni Arab tribal Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, whose Awakening Council movement helped kick al Qaeda out its strongholds in western Iraq, but was until recently deeply mistrustful of Maliki's Shi'ite-led government.

"He amended the pact from a powerful position. He wants the central government to be strong ... for the unity of Iraq."

Such has Maliki's power grown that his critics have started to make unflattering comparisons with Iraq's last strongman.

At a protest against the security pact last week, some supporters of Sadr shouted: "Maliki is just like Saddam."

But Maliki depends greatly on support from key politicians in his ruling Shi'ite alliance. The grueling negotiations with opposing factions he went through to pass the pact show how he has had to manage dissent by accommodating it, not crushing it.

Parliament passed the pact with 149 votes out of 198 deputies present, after he agreed to put it to a referendum next year.

"Saddam ruled by decree; Maliki is shackled by a constitution and his bloc," said Iraqi analyst Kadhim al-Miqdad.

BIG TESTS

But analysts fear that he will become more authoritarian.

One effect of the pact will be that the United States will no longer be able to make its military support conditional on reforms Washington says are crucial for reconciling Iraq's fractious sectarian and ethnic groups.

Sunni Arabs complain an amnesty law for mostly Sunni prisoners detained in the insurgency has yet to be implemented.

Festering disputes with ethnic Kurds over oil reserves and land threaten to undermine Maliki's coalition and boil over into violence.

"There will be little room for the United States to make demands in terms of national reconciliation ... Maliki may feel confident to increase his assertiveness toward the Kurds, who no longer will be needed to secure his dominance," said Visser.

Much may depend on how parties in Maliki's ruling alliance fare in provincial elections in January -- a key test of his popular support ahead of general elections expected in December.

And violence remains a headache. A suicide bomber killed 12 people during prayers in a mosque on Friday, raising doubts about how ready Iraqi forces will be to handle security.

(Additional reporting by Khalid al-Ansary and Mohammed Abbas; Editing by Michael Christie and Samia Nakhoul)