Q+A: The new U.S. strategy in Afghanistan

By Jonathon Burch

KABUL (Reuters) - Thousands of U.S. Marines stormed deep into Taliban territory in the Helmand River valley on Thursday at the start of a major new offensive Washington hopes will turn the tide of the war in Afghanistan.

The offensive is the first major operation under Washington's new strategy for Afghanistan and is drawn from the 8,500 Marines who arrived in the southern province over the past two months to bolster over-stretched British forces in Taliban strongholds.

The Marines are the biggest single wave of an additional 17,000 extra U.S. troops and 4,000 more to train Afghan forces ordered by President Barack Obama. U.S. forces will reach 68,000 by year-end, more than double the 32,000 at the end of 2008.

Former special operations chief General Stanley McChrystal has meanwhile taken command of the present 90,000 U.S. and NATO troops with the Pentagon saying it is time for "fresh thinking."

Following are questions and answers about the new strategy and the main areas McChrystal wants to address.

WHAT IS THE COMMAND STRUCTURE?

McChrystal has a second-in-command in a newly created post. Lieutenant General David Rodriguez is in charge of the day-to-day running of foreign forces in Afghanistan. This mirrors the structure used in Iraq by General David Petraeus, now commander of U.S. forces in central Asia and the Middle East.

This allows McChrystal to focus on strategy, diplomacy and training Afghan security forces. He and Rodriguez have been close friends for more than 30 years.

McChrystal has also beefed up his media strategy, calling Rear Admiral Greg Smith out of retirement. Smith coordinated communications in Iraq for Petraeus.

COUNTER-INSURGENCY OR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE?

Since taking over last month, McChrystal has told commanders in Afghanistan he wants a "cultural shift" away from conventional warfare toward counter-insurgency operations aimed at winning the support of Afghans.

His predecessor General David McKiernan was removed, most experts believe, because Washington was losing patience with conventional tactics that failed to quell mounting violence.

McChrystal has said most forces in Afghanistan were designed for conventional "high-intensity" combat using every asset available. One of his priorities now will be to draw insurgents away from ordinary Afghans, saying foreign forces need "to convince people, not kill them."

That would make the new Afghan strategy similar to that Patraeus used in Iraq under the so-called surge from early 2007. If McChrystal follows that pattern, the Marines will push out of large base camps to establish smaller forward operating bases, or FOBs, to live and fight among ordinary Afghans.

The same strategy might also see the use of community-based guard forces along the lines of tribal councils that sprang up among Sunni Muslim communities in western Iraq at roughly the same time as the surge, a major turning point in the war there.